We propose a novel tapstroke inference attack method, called TapSnoop, that precisely recovers what user types on touchscreen devices. Inferring tapstrokes is challenging owing to 1) low tapstroke intensity and 2) dynamically-changing noise. We address these challenges by revealing the unique characteristics of tapstrokes from audio recordings exploited by TapSnoop as a side channel of tapstrokes. In particular, we develop tapstroke detection and localization algorithms that collectively leverage audio features obtained from multiple microphones, which are designed to reflect the core properties of tapstrokes. Furthermore, we improve its robustness against environmental changes, by developing environment-adaptive classification and noise subtraction algorithms. Extensive experiments with ten real-world users on both number and QWERTY keyboards show that TapSnoop can achieve an inference accuracy of 85.4% and 75.6% (96.2% and 90.8% in best case scenarios) in stable environments, respectively. TapSnoop can also achieve a reasonable accuracy even with varying noise. For example, it shows an inference accuracy of 84.8% and 72.7% in a numeric keyboard when the noise level is varied from 37.9 to 51.2 dBA and 46.7 to 60.0 dBA, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Latest mobile devices are equipped with a rich set of sensors including GPS, light, motion (e.g., accelerometer and gyroscope), and sound (i.e., microphone) sensors. By combining abundant information from these sensors with signal processing techniques, many useful tools, such as localization [1] - [3] , gesture recognition [4] - [7] , and virtual mouse [8] , [9] and keyboard [10] - [13] applications have been proposed.
Interestingly, the capabilities of sensors have been a double-edged sword for users. While they can enrich user experience, they also threaten user privacy. Liu et al. [14] and Mole [15] used motion sensors on smartwatches, and Liu et al. [16] utilized microphones on smartphones to infer keystrokes on a physical keyboard.
In this work, we aim to show that sensitive information may leak during typing on an on-screen keyboard of commodity mobile devices that exploit touchscreens as their major input The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jingchang Huang .
interface. More specifically, we investigate the feasibility of eavesdropping a user's tap inputs, tapstrokes, from audio sensor data, which are called tapsound. Imagine the following scenario. A user enters her credit card number to purchase something in a shopping application (e.g., Amazon app) and a malicious application sneakily collects audio streams from built-in microphones in the background. It then sends the streams to an adversary's server and infers the tap inputs using a classification model constructed using a pre-collected training set.
In the real world, however, it is much challenging to leverage tapsounds to make inference about when a user taps a screen (tapstroke detection) and the tapped location (tapstroke localization), as compared to the inference on physical keyboards [14] - [16] . This is primarily because users tap the screen of mobile devices softly, generating weak tapsounds. That is, the received tapsounds have low SNR (signal-to-noise ratio) even in quiet places and the effect of noise increases in both detecting and localizing tapstrokes. In addition, users can use the devices in various and dynamically VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ changing environments, i.e., with different and unpredictable noise. Thus, due to these unpredictable changes of noise, acoustic features can vary even between tapstrokes on the same input location.
A. PREVIOUS WORK
Existing studies have already explored the feasibility of recovering tap locations with built-in sensors, but they have shown limited implications in terms of accuracy and robustness. TapPrints [17] showed that tapstrokes can be inferred by using accelerometers and gyroscopes on smart devices. The accuracy of such methods is, however, insufficient to precisely localize tap inputs, mainly because of the restricted capabilities of motion sensors (e.g., a low-sampling rate (~220 Hz)). Narain et al. [18] tackled the limitations of motion-based approaches by leveraging microphones that support higher sampling rates (e.g., 48 kHz). However, the feasibility was demonstrated under very limited environments, such as when users strongly tap a screen in a quiet place, and with a strong assumption that we can know when a user taps a screen. Furthermore, all prior works have built classification models without considering environmental changes (e.g., the variation of noise). These static schemes inherently lead to a sharp performance drop; for example, when the training and test data are collected in different environments. Therefore, because these studies do not consider the practical challenges, their approaches cannot be easily applied to infer tapstrokes in practice.
B. OUR APPROACH
We develop TapSnoop, that allows the precise detection and localization of tapstrokes, irrespective of their intensity, robustly against dynamic environmental changes. The two key underlying technologies enabling TapSnoop are as follows. First, we collectively use multiple microphones present in a single mobile device to obtain plenty of valuable information. In particular, based on our deep study on tapsounds and stereo audio recordings, we design novel detection and localization features that can represent the core characteristics of tapstrokes even if their intensity is low. Second, to address the problem of environmental changes, we adaptively leverage observations of target environments in designing classification algorithms. For example, we train a classification model with a training set synthesized with noise signals observed in the target environments. The contribution of our work can be summarized as follows.
• We intensively observe the fundamental feasibility and challenges of inferring tapstrokes with tapsounds.
• We study the characteristics of received tapsounds in multi-microphone environments. Based on the observations, we design novel features, such as subtracted intensity and MSS (Merged and Smoothed Spectrogram), that collaboratively leverage multiple audio recordings to increase the feasibility of TapSnoop in detecting and localizing tapstrokes.
• We evaluate the performance of TapSnoop through an extensive experiment by collecting approximately 40,000 pieces of tapstroke sensor data from 10 users. Our evaluation results show that TapSnoop achieves a high degree of inference accuracy (85.4% for numeric keyboard and 75.6% for QWERTY keyboard), indicating that it outperforms all existing inference models and introduces severe security threats.
II. THREAT MODEL
The objective of the adversary described in this paper is to eavesdrop on the sound triggered by tapstrokes on an onscreen keyboard of touchscreen devices and infer the input values. We make the following assumptions in our threat model. First, the adversary needs to install a malicious application on the target user's device. The adversary can manipulate and repackage a useful existing application and distribute it to third-party app markets to trick victims to install it on their devices. Alternatively, the adversary can create a benignlooking application and upload it to any app market.
Second, the adversary's application should be able to access the built-in microphones on the target device even in the background. In Android, a popular mobile platform, recording sound requires a user to grant the RECORD_AUDIO permission during the installation process. This permission is, however, widely used in Android applications 1 . The adversary's application can disguise itself as a legitimate voice user interface application that requires access to the microphone and users may grant the permission easily. Once the application acquires this permission, it can sneakily gather sensor data in the background without any additional process.
Third, depending on the computing resources of the target device, the adversary can infer tapstrokes on the device or her remote server. In the latter case, the application is required to send the collected information when WiFi or cellular networks are available, which requires the INTERNET permission.
Last, for the best accuracy, the adversary needs to construct a classification model with a training data set, a set of sensor data labeled by corresponding tap locations (e.g., a tapped key id), collected from a victim user. In Android, only the application currently running in the foreground can obtain touch events. By capturing this, the adversary's application may provide useful functions (e.g., chat) and collect the training data when the user is using the application. This is a reasonable assumption because previous studies on Android sidechannel attacks proposed similar threat models [17] , [19] .
III. UNDERSTANDING TAPSTROKE INFERENCE
In this section, we investigate the feasibility of tapstroke inference and its challenges with the following two preliminary experiments. First, we explore the possibilities for FIGURE 1. Tapsound generated by a tapstroke. Once a user taps a screen, a tapsound is generated due to the collision and captured from nearby microphones.
tapstroke inference in a controlled environment. Second, we conduct real-world observations to determine practical challenges based on the differences between the real-world and controlled environments.
Preliminary Experiment Setup: A single user participated in both controlled and real-world experiments. In both experiments, the user used the same Nexus 6 smartphone (6inch display) and tapped each key (i.e., a to z) 30 times on an Android default QWERTY keyboard while holding the smartphone in a quiet classroom. In particular, for the controlled experiment, we asked the participant to tap the screen strongly. In contrast, for the real-world experiment, we requested nothing to the participant. We then collected audio sensor data using the built-in microphones.
A. FEASIBILITY OF INFERRING TAPSTROKES
Users typically input texts on touchscreen devices through finger taps, triggering tapsounds (see Figure 1 (a)). When a finger and a touchscreen device collide, some kinetic energy from the moving finger is transmitted to the device. Some of the kinetic energy is converted into other types of energy including sound due to the inelastic collision. For instance, the surface of these objects (e.g., the screen panel and finger skin) vibrates due to the collision and the vibration propagates through the neighboring air molecules as a sound wave (i.e., tapsound). The wave is then transferred to the microphones near the tap location. Figure 1 (b) shows the typical structure of received tapsounds. It is first observed with a high degree of amplitude, which drops gradually as the surface vibration driven by the tapstroke is dampened, and disappears after 20 ms from its beginning.
Interestingly, different tapstroke locations on a screen yield different tapsounds. For simplicity, consider the strings of a guitar. Their fluctuations vary depending on the plucking point, while playing different harmonics. Likewise, depending on the tap location, the screen vibrates differently and generates a unique tapsound. Furthermore, the tapsound experiences different types of reflection, diffraction, and intervention while traveling to microphones. Thus, as demonstrated in Figure 2 (a), it is feasible to differentiate tapsounds emanating from different tap locations and localize tapstrokes based on the acoustic features. Pearson correlation between tapsounds generated on different keys. We compute the correlation by using tapsounds collected in our preliminary experiment. More specifically, for each key, we selected five tapsounds, i.e., we used 25 tapsounds to calculate the correlation.
B. CHALLENGES IN TAPSTROKE INFERENCE
Practical situations, however, significantly differ from controlled environments, which complicates tapstroke inference. For example, our results in the real-world experiments show that the correlation decreases even between tapsounds on the same location (see Figure 2 (b)). Thus, to infer the tapstrokes, we must address the following challenges.
C. LOW SNR TAPSOUNDS
In general, users tap a screen softly, i.e., the total amount of convertible kinetic energy is low. In addition, some of the kinetic energy is lost in the form of heat after tapstroke collision and only the remaining low level energy goes into generating tapsounds. Due to this, the received tapsounds have low SNR even in quiet environments, thereby causing problems in both detecting and localizing tapstrokes. First, the amplitude of the tapsounds is similar to or slightly higher than noise. Therefore, it is difficult to detect the occurrence of tapsounds in audio recordings. Second, the localization features of tapsounds are easily distorted by noise, thereby disturbing tapstroke localization.
D. DYNAMICALLY CHANGING NOISE
Mobile devices can be placed in quiet places (e.g., an office or bedroom) or in very noisy places (e.g., a shopping mall). Users can also utilize them while moving around. In other words, noise can vary dynamically and unpredictably. Such noise is often mixed with tapsounds and distorts the features of tapsounds differently depending on the measurement environment. That is, for the best accuracy, a classification model should be built with data collected in an environment similar to that of the target environment. However, it is not feasible to collect training data for all possible conditions.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous works have properly addressed these challenges in designing acousticbased tapstroke inference schemes.
• Simple peak detection. The most common way to detect target signals is to compare the peak values with a predefined threshold [13] , [14] , [16] . However, in tapstroke inference, it is not easy to set a proper threshold value due to the low SNR of tapsounds and unpredictable changes of noise. • Classification-based localization. A particular class of tapstroke inference works by constructing a classification model with acoustic features [10] , [13] , [18] . However, they assume high SNR environments, showing a sharp performance drop with soft tapstrokes [18] . Moreover, they do not consider the effect of environmental changes in constructing their classification models. Thus, they show limited performance in the real world.
• TDoA-based localization. Other studies attempted to localize sound sources by utilizing the Time-Differenceof-Arrivals (TDoA) between microphones [11] , [12] , [14] , [16] , [20] . However, high SNR signals are required to precisely measure the TDoA. In addition, it is known that the TDoA between microphones cannot be precisely measured for tapsounds that propagate through multiple mediums [11] .
IV. TapSnoop OVERVIEW
We design TapSnoop, a tapstroke inferencing framework, that supports a high degree of 1) accuracy and 2) robustness even in the presence of weak tapsounds and unpredictable noise.
The key enabler of TapSnoop is leveraging multiple acoustic sensors collaboratively. Using multiple (at least two) microphones can help obtain a rich amount of information regarding tapsounds as well as noise. After capturing this, we first study the characteristics of tapsounds and noise observed in stereo microphones. We then extract novel acoustic features, called Subtracted Intensity and Merged and Smoothed Spectrogram, for tapstroke detection and localization, respectively. Moreover, we reflect dynamic environmental changes in designing classification algorithms through the adaptive construction of training datasets.
Overall procedure of TapSnoop: TapSnoop consists of two parts: 1) an application that collects sensor data and 2) a server that builds a classification model and infers tapstrokes based on the given sensor data and model.
• TapSnoop application. The application runs in the background, while continuously collecting audio sensor data from multiple microphones, and sends the raw data to a server. In particular, for energy efficiency, TapSnoop performs sensing only when touch events are triggered. We will describe the implementation details for tracking touch events on Android in Section VII. Note that as explained in II, when users are using the application in the foreground, TapSnoop can obtain information about tap inputs (e.g., tapped key identifiers). In this case, we gather the location information through sensor data and use it to construct a ground truth dataset.
• TapSnoop server. Figure 3 illustrates how the server infers the location of tapstrokes through the collaborative use of multiple microphones. Upon receiving the raw data, the server filters out noise by comparing audio recordings from different microphones. It then detects tapsounds within the given samples based on the energy of sound. Finally, it extracts MSS features from the tapsounds and identifies the location of the detected tapstrokes by comparing their features with those of training data collected from the victim in advance. At this time, to support robust tapstroke inference against environmental changes, we adaptively optimize a set of training data based on the noise information obtained from the environment in which test data are collected.
V. COLLABORATIVE TAPSTROKE DETECTION
In this section, we describe how TapSnoop leverages multiple audio recordings to accurately detect tapstrokes even in cases in which the SNR of tapsounds is low and the noise dynamically varies.
A. AMBIENT NOISE CANCELLATION
Recently, to improve the quality of recording, two-channel microphones have been built into many commodity mobile devices. Figure 4 shows the common placement of the two microphones. The primary microphone is installed at the bottom of the device to support fundamental functions such as a phone calling. In contrast, the secondary microphone is placed far away from the primary one, such as at the top, to support spatial recordings.
Owing to this placement, received tapsounds show different timing and power characteristics on each microphone (see Figure 4 (b)). The primary microphone, which is usually close to the on-screen keyboard, records the tapsounds with a high degree of energy, while the signals are rarely observed on the secondary microphone. This is because the level of sound decreases proportional to the traveling distance. In contrast, ambient noise is recorded similarly on both sides (see Figure 4 (c)). In general, the distance between microphones is tiny compared to that between the source of the noise and the device. This makes the background noise reach each microphone with almost the same distance. In addition, the electric noise generated by hardware is observed very similarly in both microphones because they are connected in the same circuit.
Based on these observations, TapSnoop reduces the interference from ambient noise by subtracting the sound level measured on the secondary microphone from that measured on the primary one; this process is called time-domain noise subtraction. Let x P (t) and x S (t) denote the amplitude of tapsounds at time t on the primary and secondary recordings, respectively. Once the raw samples recorded on both microphones are delivered, TapSnoop simply cancels background noise from x P (t) as follows.
where x C (t) is the canceled amplitude at time t.
B. ADAPTIVE TAPSOUND SEGMENTATION
One of the challenges in detecting tapstrokes is to avoid false positives even with unpredictable changes in noise levels.
To address this, we utilize the Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) algorithm [21] that adaptively determines a threshold for distinguishing between tapsounds and noise. We first divide the noise-cancelled audio samples x C into multiple windows with a fixed size of 100 ms and an interval of 5 ms between the starting points of consecutive windows. Note that the size is the typical length of tapsounds observed in Section III-A. For the i-th window w i , TapSnoop computes the intensity of sound s i as the sum of the magnitude (i.e., the absolute value of FFT) 2 .
TapSnoop then determines the existence of tapstrokes in w i based on the distribution of noise levels N (µ i , σ 2 i ) and a constant probability of false alarm p * ; where µ i and σ i are estimated by calculating the average and standard deviation of the fused intensities observed in the previous ten windows from w i and p * is empirically set to 0.0001%. Given N (µ i , σ 2 i ), we compute p i , the cumulative probability for s i as
2 In the rest of this paper, the intensity of sensor data refers to the total amount of energy captured in the data, which can be computed by summing its magnitude.
Finally, we decide that a tapstroke exists in w i 1) if p i is greater than or equal to 1 − p * and 2) if the time gap from the last tapstroke exceeds a safe margin. The margin is set to 200 ms according to the minimum tapstroke interval observed in a previous field study [22] .
VI. COLLABORATIVE TAPSTROKE LOCALIZATION
After detecting tapstrokes, two datasets are given to identify their specific locations. One is a set of tapsounds to be inferred, called the test set. The other is a training set collected from a victim user in advance. In this section, we first extract features from tapsounds that can represent the characteristics of tapstrokes even in low SNR environments. Then, using the acoustic features, we localize tapstrokes in the test set in comparison to the training data set adaptively configured for the given environment.
A. FEATURE EXTRACTION
TapSnoop extracts MSS (Merged and Smoothed Spectrogram) from the tapsounds of both datasets to localize tapstrokes. The key ideas of designing MSS are 1) including as many information about tapstrokes as possible by using time-frequency features, called spectrogram, and merging the spectrograms obtained from multiple microphones and 2) mitigating the effect of noise by smoothing features.
TapSnoop first divides tapsounds into n W windows with a window size of 10 ms (half the length of tapsounds) and a 75.0% (3 of 4) overlap between consecutive windows. For each sub-window of the tapsounds, we obtain its magnitude spectrum by using FFT with n F coefficients, where n F is empirically set to 64. At this step, we can apply noise subtraction techniques to reduce the effect of noise in localizing tapstrokes, similar to the detection process. However, they can incur loss of information about tapsounds as well as noise. Therefore, instead of using these schemes, we alleviate the noise, especially random white noise (e.g., thermal noise), via simple smoothing techniques. Figure 5 depicts the spectrum of tapsounds that fluctuates due to the random noise. The randomness of fluctuation makes the tapsounds generated on the same location dissimilar. Therefore, TapSnoop smooths each spectrum by applying a linear predictive coding [23] with 52 coefficients.
TapSnoop then constructs MSS by merging the smoothed spectrums of the sub-windows. In particular, for a single tapstroke, we have n M tapsounds, where n M is the number of microphones. To use all this information, we simply concatenate the spectrums extracted from each tapsound, i.e., MSS consists of n M * n W * n F spectral coefficient values. As the final step, TapSnoop transforms the MSS in decibel (dB) units. optimized for t i . TapSnoop then identifies the location of the tapstrokes by using the classification model.
B. ADAPTIVE TAPSTROKE CLASSIFICIATION
As discussed in III-B, it is infeasible to collect a training set from all possible environments; thus a large amount of training data can be loosely related to the test data owing to the variations of noise. To overcome this, we exploit the characteristics of ambient noise that can be easily observed in the real world. Figure 7 shows that noise has similar patterns between neighboring samples. Capturing this temporal locality, TapSnoop creates an illusion that training data are collected in a similar environment with t i . First, Tap-Snoop randomly picks n N noise signals with a length of 10 ms from the audio samples collected in 1 s before t i is detected and computes MSS for the extracted signals. Let m j and m N i,k denote the MSS of the j-th training data and the k-th noise signal of t i , respectively. For each pair of j and k, we generate the new MSS m i,j,k as the sum of m j and m N i,k . We then build L that includes all possible m i,j,k , i.e., it consists of n N * n L MSS where n L is the number of training data.
After generating the adaptive training set, TapSnoop constructs a classification model c i for the test data t i using the MSS of the training data. For this, we use the SVM classification method, particularly with the C-SVC multi-class categorization scheme and a linear type kernel function [24] . The test signal t i is localized by comparing its MSS with the corresponding model. TapSnoop first computes the class membership probability (i.e., the likelihood to be classified into a certain key identifier) for t i based on the extended version of Platt scaling [25] . Let p i (j) denote the probability of t i being in the j-th class. Then, TapSnoop decides its tapped location k i , i.e., the corresponding key identifier, where the probability is maximized.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION
Our implementation of TapSnoop consists of two parts. 1) An application that collects training and test data and transmits them to the server. 2) A server application that runs our inference algorithm on a desktop computer. We implement the application on an Android device (Nexus 6) running Android 7.0. The application captures raw sensor data using built-in stereo microphones; this is done as frequently as possible with a sampling rate of 48 kHz. The server program runs on a desktop PC (with Intel Core i5-4760 CPU and 16 GB of memory). Especially, it uses LIBSVM [26] on MATLAB to conduct supervised learning.
Tracking the presence of touch events on Android: As explained in Section IV, an attacker is required to know whether a user is making some inputs. Toward this, we refer to the /proc file system that contains various types of information for each process (e.g., its corresponding application name, pid, and total execution time). First, we obtain the name of the touchscreen sensor embedded in the target device and finds an interrupt number assigned to the sensor. TapSnoop then periodically tracks the number of triggered interrupts on the touchscreen sensor, which increases only when a touch event occurs.
VIII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate TapSnoop by answering the following questions:
1) How accurately can TapSnoop infer tapstrokes in static environments? 2) How robustly can TapSnoop infer tapstrokes in dynamic environments, i.e., with the presence of unpredictable noise?
A. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
We recruited 10 participants (4 females / 6 males) and asked them to type ten to thirteen randomly-generated letters (a to z) and numbers (0 to 9) on QWERTY and numeric onscreen keyboards. Note that we set the sequence length in a range of [10, 13] because this is the commonly recommended password length. Participants then made tapstrokes with their most familiar holding styles on both Nexus 6 and 4 in a portrait mode (which is the most common orientation). From each participant, we collected 500 (for number typing) and 1300 (for character typing) tapstroke data, i.e., approximately 50 tapstrokes data per key. We then gathered raw audio sensor data as well as the time of pressing for each tapstroke during the whole experiment.
To observe the performance of TapSnoop in an ideal environment (i.e., with little noise), we conducted the user study in a quiet room (a classroom) that had a low noise level of [30.2, 42.3] dBA. We then simply synthesized the ambient noise captured from the real world (e.g., office, park, and bus) with the sensor data collected from our user study to show how the presence of noise affects the inference accuracy. We did not undertake any additional user studies to validate the noise robustness because each participant's tap intensity cannot be identical for each place and time, thereby making it difficult to solely measure the effect of noise.
Metrics: We verified the performance of the proposed detection and localization algorithms with two metrics: 1) detection accuracy and 2) inference accuracy.
• Detection accuracy. The accuracy of detection algorithms is measured using recall, precision, and F1-score [27] . Given n T tapstrokes, the recall and precision of detection algorithms are computed as n D n T and n D n D +n FD , where n D and n FD are the number of detected tapstrokes (true-positives) and falsely detected noise signals (false-positives), respectively. We then compute its F1-score as the harmonic mean of recall and precision.
• Inference accuracy. We define inference accuracy as the F1-score of inference results, which is computed as 2·n I n I +n T +n FI , where n I is the number of true-positives (tapstrokes detected and correctly localized) and n FI is that of false-positives (falsely-detected noise signals and detected but incorrectly-localized tapstrokes).
B. PERFORMANCE OF TapSnoop IN IDEAL ENVIRONMENT
We observe at the performance of TapSnoop when users are typing in a quiet room. Toward this, we first show the overall performance of TapSnoop by applying all the proposed techniques. We then verify how each TapSnoop technique affects its performance, especially by comparing it with techniques proposed in previous works. Note that, in this experiment, we evaluate TapSnoop using 10-fold cross-validation of the collected data. Figure 8 depicts the overall inference accuracy of Tap-Snoop on both number and QWERTY-type keyboards when all proposed techniques are applied. It achieves a high degree of accuracy for both numeric keyboard (85.4% on average) and QWERTY keyboard (75.6%), which has a dense keyboard layout (see Figure 8a ). That is, for a QWERTY keyboard, TapSnoop improves the performance by approximately 20 times in comparison to the simplest random mechanism. Note that the probability of correctly inferring tapstrokes with a random prediction algorithm is, on average, only 1/10 = 10% (for numbers) and 1/26 = 3.8% (for letters).
1) OVERALL INFERENCE ACCURACY OF TapSnoop
The inference accuracy of TapSnoop varies mainly depending on a user's tapstroke intensity (see Figure 8b ). We observed that U3 strongly tapped the screen, incurring abrupt changes in sensor data. This enables TapSnoop to correctly infer many tapstrokes (> 90.8% of tapstrokes on any type of keyboard). The gentle tapstroke style of U10, in contrast, leads to a decrease in the inference accuracy. However, reasonable accuracy levels of 74.1% and 51.0% for each type of keyboard are still obtained, outperforming the previouslyreported results [18] . A device type can also affect the performance (see Table 1 ). The inference accuracy on Nexus 6 is slightly higher than that on Nexus 4. This is because Nexus 6 has a bigger screen than Nexus 4, allowing a less fine-grained keyboard layout.
We further analyze the inference capability of Tap-Snoop with the inference accuracy of top-k results (see Figure 8c ). As we observed, in the first attempt, the performance of TapSnoop can be limited depending on the user. However, by considering more candidates, the accuracy can dramatically increase. For example, by choosing only the top four candidates, TapSnoop identifies tap locations more precisely (i.e., 92.1% (number) and 86.0% (QWERTY) inference accuracy on average with the low standard deviation of 2.9% and 6.2%, respectively). Thus, TapSnoop might cause severe security threats such as private information leakage for real-world users.
2) EFFECT OF TAPSTROKE DETECTION
To evaluate the impacts of tapstroke detection in inferring tapstrokes, we compare the performance of three detection algorithms, i.e., 1) static, 2) CFAR, and 3) CFAR after noise VOLUME 8, 2020 subtraction. The first two approaches utilize audio sensor data obtained from a single microphone. In particular, the static approach utilizes a static threshold for determining the presence of tapstrokes as used in prior works [14] , [16] . The threshold is empirically set to 0.001. In contrast, the CFAR method determines the threshold dynamically as proposed in Section V-B. The last approach also uses CFAR, but compares multiple audio recordings to subtract noise before deciding the threshold. Figure 9 illustrates how each scheme affects the detection accuracy. Compared to the static scheme, the use of CFAR significantly improves the precision of tapstroke detection (by up to 11.2%). This is mainly because we can reduce the number of false positives by dynamically determining the threshold values based on the observations on noise variations. In addition, with our noise subtraction technique, we can mitigate the effect of noise in tapstroke detection, allowing the detection of more tapstrokes with a lower number of false positives. As the result of this collaborative use of multiple microphones, we further enhance the recall and precision of detecting tapstrokes and achieve high F1-score (> 93.6% on each type of keyboard).
3) EFFECT OF TAPSTROKE LOCALIZATION
We next verify how precisely, with the help of localization features, TapSnoop identifies the location of tapstrokes. Especially, we estimate the performance of our proposed feature, MSS , by comparing it with those of others, including raw audio samples and a simple spectrum used in previous works [10] , [18] . It is worth noting that we configured the parameters for each technique similar to those mentioned in the previous works, except that we concatenated their features extracted from multiple audio recordings. In addition, to observe the effect of the proposed techniques separately, we compare two features: 1) LPC (smoothed spectrograms obtained from a single microphone) and 2) MSS (smoothed and merged spectrograms). Figure 10 shows the effects of various localization features on tapstroke inference accuracy. MSS outperforms all existing techniques. Interestingly, LPC that uses a single microphone shows improvements in inference accuracy of up to 33.7% and 9.8% in comparison to those of raw audio samples and spectrum features obtained using dual microphones. In other words, although we use a single microphone, by effectively reducing the effect of random noise, we can extract more useful features for tapstroke classification. Furthermore, by merging the smoothed spectrograms, we can leverage more information about tapstrokes and achieve a high degree of inference accuracy (85.4% and 75.6% on each type of keyboard).
C. ROBUSTNESS OF TapSnoop AGAINST CHANGES IN NOISE
We evaluate how well our proposed techniques help in tapstroke detection and localization in the presence of noise. To this end, we first captured real-world noise from three places (office, park, and bus). These places were chosen because 1) they are commonly-accessed locations and 2) they show different noise characteristics, as evident in Table 2 . We then used the previously-collected data to synthesize each noise. It should be noted that, in this experiment, we localize tapstrokes by comparing the synthesized noisy data with a classifier built with the target user's data collected in a quiet room. Figure 11 illustrates the detection accuracy of TapSnoop as it depends on the applied features and techniques. With a moderate level of noise, using multiple microphones can help in mitigating the effect of noise, leading to a high degree of tapstroke detection accuracy (e.g., average F1-score of 95.4% and 94.0% in office and park, respectively). In other words, through the proposed noise subtraction, we can improve the 
1) RECALL AND PRECISION OF DETECTION WITH NOISE

SNR of tapsounds sufficiently to detect a lot of tapstrokes.
A further increase in noise levels, however, can lead to accuracy drop. For example, owing to the loud noise, the detection accuracy of TapSnoop decreases to 76.2%. Figure 12 shows the effectiveness of our noise-tolerant techniques (LPC smoothing, spectrogram concatenation, and adaptive training set generation) on TapSnoop's inference accuracy. In an office, MSS can include many valuable characteristics of tapstrokes, showing a high degree of accuracy (84.8% and 74.7% on each type of keyboard). Because there are only subtle effects from noise, inference accuracy rarely changes despite using a set of training data adaptively configured on the basis of the observations on test data.
2) INFERENCE ACCURACY IN THE PRESENCE OF NOISE
With a moderate level of noise (e.g., in a park), MSS is more distorted and the MSS of training data becomes more dissimilar with that of test data. Thus, its inference accuracy drops to 59.6% (for numeric keyboard) and 43.4% (for QWERTY keyboard). To overcome performance degradation, we can optimize a set of training data as proposed in Section VI. For example, through the adaptive training set generation, TapSnoop can create an illusion that both training and test data are collected in similar environments, thereby increasing the accuracy of tapstroke inference to 72.7% and 57.5% for each type of keyboard.
However, the feasibility of inferring tapstrokes further decreases in very noisy environments (e.g., in a bus). As evident in Figure 12 , TapSnoop suffers from a low degree of inference accuracy (51.6% and 33.6% for numeric and QWERTY keyboard on average, respectively). This is because the place contains a significant amount of noise that varies dynamically and abruptly. In such a case, even when we extract MSS and optimize a training data set, there still remains a lot of dynamically-changing noise in sensor data, which makes the precise inference of tapstrokes difficult. However, we believe that TapSnoop is still a valid and powerful attack model that can be applied in many real-world environments, such as homes, offices, and parks.
D. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST THE ABSENCE OF TARGET USER'S DATA
The results we have shown so far are estimated by crossvalidating a victim user's data. However, in practice, an insufficient number of or even no training data can be obtained from the victim user. To verify the robustness of Tap-Snoop against this lack of victim's training data, we first estimate the inference accuracy with a classification model constructed with other user's data. We then find how much victim user's training data is required for TapSnoop to support a high degree of inference accuracy by gradually increasing the number of the target user's data in the training set. Note that, in this experiment, we built a training dataset that includes 50 data for each key by randomly picking n V data from the target's dataset and 50−n V data from the other user's dataset. Figure 13 illustrates the inference accuracy of Tap-Snoop with a different number of victim user's data in a training set. TapSnoop experiences a severe performance degradation when the victim does not contribute to constructing a training model, showing an average inference accuracy of 53.1% and 43.7% for each type of keyboard. This is because different users can enter tap inputs using a different tapstroke style. The inference accuracy increases as more victim user data are trained, as shown in Figure 13 . For example, when n V is 30, TapSnoop shows an average improvement of 30.3% and 26.3% on each keyboard, as compared to the results with n V = 0. In addition, a reasonable level of accuracy is achieved even when n V equals 10 (on average, 77.8% and 61.3% accuracy for numbers and for letters, respectively). To this end, if we assume that a user types a single input every 1 s, TapSnoop can precisely infer the user's tapstrokes with a data collection time of 1.5 minutes (for 10×10 number inputs) and 4.5 minutes (for 26×10 letter inputs).
IX. RELATED WORK A. MICROPHONE ARRAY-BASED SOUND SOURCE LOCALIZATION
An array of microphones has been traditionally used for localizing objects. For example, some works [28] - [30] have leveraged the acoustic array as a wild area surveillance sensor for tracking target movement or detecting target intrusion. However, these works require a specialized hardware, such as an array of four or more microphones, for localizing objects. Therefore, these methods cannot be applied to infer tapstrokes on commodity mobile devices that have a small number of microphones.
B. ACOUSTIC BASED ON-SURFACE TOUCH INTERFACES
Several techniques have tried to enable ubiquitous on-surface touch interaction, especially leveraging sound. UbiK [10] , UbiTap [11] , Toffee [12] , and VibSense [13] exploit touch sounds generated by a user's touch impact on solid surfaces to build virtual on-surface keyboards or touchscreens. More specifically, they extract localization features based on the deep understanding of how sounds are transferred on solid surfaces. However, for an accurate touch localization, these works ask users to utilize hard touch tools, e.g., their nail tips, that can generate strong touch sounds. This requirement cannot be easily satisfied in our target environments.
C. KEYSTROKE INFERENCE
Many studies have shown the feasibility of inferring a user's inputs on a physical keyboard. For example, Liu et al. [14] and MoLe [15] introduced a new security threat with smartwatches, inferring keystrokes on physical keyboards by observing different smartwatch movements as they depend on the location of keystrokes. Recently, Liu et al. [16] also presented a keystroke inference attack on physical keyboards. They improved the inference accuracy by using TDoA information, even without training. However, the recovery of tapstrokes addressed in our work introduces new and difficult challenges that have not been dealt with in previous works. For example, as explained in Section III-B, the low SNR of tapsounds makes it infeasible to apply the TDoAbased approach proposed in [16] . In addition, it is known that the TDoA-based approach does not work properly when sounds propagate through multiple mediums [11] . However, tapsounds are transferred to microphones through not only air but also screen surfaces. Thus, such differences motivated a new solution.
D. TAPSTROKE INFERENCE
Narain et al. [18] showed the feasibility of tapstroke inference using information from a built-in stereo microphone. Shumailov et al. [20] leveraged the TDoA of tapsounds between multiple microphones to recover a user's tap inputs. These systems, however, perform well only if users are stationary or in a quiet place (i.e., bedroom) while typing very strongly. More specifically, Narain et al. [18] assumed a lessrealistic attack model in which users utilize a specific custom keyboard that provides information regarding when a key is pressed. In contrast, we propose both tapstroke detection and localization algorithms designed to reflect the characteristics of tapstrokes along with environmental variations, thereby providing much higher accuracy in practice.
Some works have leveraged other types of sensors, such as IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) sensors and cameras. For example, early works including TouchLogger [31] , TapLogger [19] , and TapPrints [17] demonstrated the feasibility of using built-in accelerometers and gyroscopes to infer tap locations, but these methods showed limited performance owing to hardware constraints, such as low sampling rate. To improve the inference accuracy, recently, TextLogger [32] and Hodges and Buckley [33] combined the IMU sensor information with the language pattern from a dictionary and the bigram model, respectively. EyeTell [34] and GazeRevealer [35] inferred tapstrokes by using a front camera of smartphones. They capture victim's eye movement patterns during password input and analyze where the user pressed. We believe that our acoustic-based approach would be able to further improve an inference accuracy by incorporating these techniques that leverage other modalities.
X. DISCUSSION
A. ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Because TapSnoop launches a client application and collects sensor data stream on IoT devices, this can cause a battery drain issue. To identify the energy consumed by the Tap-Snoop application, we measure and compare battery power changes in two cases, when a messenger application is running alone and when it is running while the TapSnoop application is executing in the background, on Nexus 4 using Trepn Profiler [36] The result shows that TapSnoop application increases the energy consumption by 109.45 mWh on average. To reduce the energy consumption, it can capture sensor streams in the background only when touch inputs are continuously generated. For example, we can periodically check the number of interrupts from touchscreen sensors in the /proc file system to know whether touch events were made. Thus, we believe that background sensing would take only a small portion of the entire running time of mobile devices, thereby introducing the negligible energy overhead.
B. VARIOUS SMARTPHONE HOLDING STYLES
People hold a mobile device in their hands differently and can change their holding style frequently [37] , making the quality of tapsounds unstable. Basically, depending on the grip, as the accessibility to each tap location changes, the variability of tapstroke intensity can increase, thereby degrading the inference accuracy significantly. One possible solution to this issue would be to recognize the user's grip properly and classify the tapstrokes separately for each grip. This point would be one of our future research directions.
C. INFERRING PASSWORDS
TapSnoop infers a user's tap inputs independent of each other. Our experimental results show that TapSnoop can localize each tapstroke precisely. However, this individual inference scheme might not work well in inferring input sequences, such as passwords. Assume that we can infer each tapstroke correctly with a probability p and a user inputs a password consisting of 10 letters. Then, the probability to correctly infer the password is p 10 . To address this, we can use the common input patterns of users. In practice, users tap a specific sequence of inputs frequently. For example, when they use an email, SNS, and shopping service, they are often asked to enter their id and password or even credit card numbers. This implies that it is feasible for an attacker to collect sensor data for a specific input multiple times, thereby increasing the possibility of inferring tapstrokes.
D. INFERENCE IN LANDSCAPE MODE
This study assumes that users use their smartphones in the portrait mode; however, they can, in practice, use both portrait and landscape modes. Although the current design of TapSnoop does not consider the use of landscape mode, we believe that TapSnoop can be extended to deal with it. For example, in the landscape mode, a primary microphone, which is close to a tap location can be changed depending on the tap location. TapSnoop can still infer the typed value if it can correctly decide the primary microphone as follows. Upon receiving the recorded sound, TapSnoop compares the amplitudes of signals recorded by two different microphones and selects the one that has a higher amplitude as the primary microphone.
E. POSSIBLE MITIGATION
One approach is to emit random noise or make the device vibrate when a user is typing on the keyboard. As mentioned in Section V-B, TapSnoop's tapstroke detection algorithm relies on concurrently capturing the intensity of both tapmotion and tapsound. Thus, if the keyboard app constantly generates random noise or makes the device vibrate while the user taps the screen, TapSnoop cannot effectively distinguish tapmotions and tapsounds from the generated noise, and will fail to detect tapstrokes.
An alternative approach is to adopt a secure keyboard that is capable of changing the key arrangement for private inputs (e.g., passwords). It is worthwhile to note that according to our survey 3 , while some banking apps use secure keyboards, many apps that embed in-app payment systems (e.g., PayPal and Amazon) do not employ such keyboards, indicating that those apps are vulnerable to TapSnoop attack.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose TapSnoop, which enables attackers to infer user-typed keys with high accuracy and robustness by exploiting tapsounds. We introduce collaborative detection and localization algorithms that collectively use multiple audio sensors and extract novel features from them based on observing the characteristics of tapsounds and noise. In particular, TapSnoop infers tapstrokes robustly against the presence of environmental variations by using noise sub- 3 We examined Android apps that use in-app payment systems, such as Amazon and PayPal, among top 50 apps in the Google Play store. traction and adaptive configurations of the training datasets. Our evaluation, conducted with ten participants, shows that TapSnoop can successfully detect and localize user inputs with a high degree of inference accuracy (85.4% and 75.6% for the two types of keyboard on average), outperforming the previously reported results. We also show that TapSnoop provides reasonable accuracy even in dynamically changing environments, such as offices and parks. Thus, we demonstrate that commonly-used microphones can be utilized for snooping tapstrokes, thereby raising severe security concerns for touchscreen users.
